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LAWYERS IN LUST: DOES NEW YORK'S NEW
RULE ADDRESSING ATTORNEY-CLIENT
SEXUAL RELATIONS DO ENOUGH?
David H. Pincus*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the issue of how to regulate attorney-client sexual
relations has confronted bar associations, state legislatures, and
state agencies. Such behavior was once accepted as the legal
profession's "dirty little secret."' However, now it is no longer
tolerable.2 The legal community's response to the issue of how to
regulate lawyer-client sex has been mixed. There are some legal
ethics critics who support a per se prohibition on the commence-
ment of attorney-client sex during the course of representing
clients. Others, like David Isbell, chairman of the A.B.A.'s
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, oppose an
outright ban because "[t]here are too many circumstances where
two consenting adults are involved and it does not impair the
ability of the lawyer to render professional services.",4 Isbell also
contends that rules banning attorney-client sexual relations are
unnecessary because current ethical practices already condemn such
* BLS Class of 1995.
'In re Marriage of Kantar, 581 N.E.2d 6 (Il1. App. 1991), appeal denied,
587 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. 1992).
2 John M. O'Connell, Note, Keeping Sex Out of the Attorney-Client
Relationship: A Proposed Rule, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 887 n.4 (1992) (discussing
lawyers who view sex with clients as a job perk).
3 Id. at 921. See also hI re Lewis, 415 S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ga. 1992).
4 Stephen Labaton, Are Divorce Lawyers Really the Sleaziest?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1993, §4, at 5.
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behavior.5 Still others argue that a ban on sex should only be
enforced in areas of practice in which clients are most vulnerable,
including domestic relations law.6 Lastly, some commentators
advocate a rule that addresses the potential abuses brought on by
lawyers' sexual relations with their clients, but does not necessarily
proscribe such behavior. For example, ethicists may employ a rule
that creates a presumption that attorneys who have sex with their
clients have provided inadequate representation because such
conduct induces a conflict of interest or breaches the fiduciary duty
the lawyer owes to the client. Thus, once a client offers proof of
an attorney-client sexual relationship, the burden shifts to the
attorney to rebut the presumption by proving that he did not exploit
his client because the representation provided was competent,
despite the sexual relationship.7
While this debate continues on the national front, New York
has recently asserted its position on attorney-client sexual inter-
action. On August 16, 1993, New York State's Chief Judge Judith
S. Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals announced stringent
new ethical rules that will be applied to domestic relations
lawyers.8 These rules combine some of the most demanding
standards found in the ethical codes of other states, including a ban
5 Id.
6 Yael Levy, Note, Attorneys, Clients and Sex; Conflicting Interests in the
California Rule, 5 GEo. J. LEGAL. ETHics 649 (1992).
7 See, e.g., Linda M. Jorgenson & Pamela K. Sutherland, Lawyers' Sex with
Clients: Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 12 No. 11 FAIRSHARE 11, (1992);
Symposium, Loose Cartoons, a National Survey of Attorney-Client Sexual
Involvement: Are there Ethical Concerns?, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 483 (1993)
[hereinafter Symposium]
Throughout this note, references will be made to clients in the feminine
and attorneys in the masculine, in recognition of the fact that most of the
complainants are female while most of the respondents are male. See The
Committee to Examine Lawyer Conduct in Matrimonial Actions, Report, May
4, 1993, at 30 [hereinafter the Report].




on sexual relations between attorney and client during the course
of representation.9 Judge Kaye implemented these measures to
"counteract public criticism and cynicism about the legal profession
and the courts."1 Recognizing that such problems also occur
outside the matrimonial practice, Judge Kaye announced the
formation of a committee to determine if similar rules should be
applied to other areas of practice.11 However, the final rules
announced by the court limit the ban on attorney-client sex to those
attorneys involved in domestic relations matters. 2
This Note examines New York State's new rules to
determine whether they adequately address the dangers of attorney-
client sexual relations. It also explores how New York should
modify its regulation of attorney-client sexual relations to encom-
pass other areas of the legal profession. The first section discusses
the purposes behind New York's adoption of the ban on attorney-
client sexual relations in domestic relations matters. It also
discusses the ban in the context of the other relevant matrimonial
representation reforms promulgated by Judge Kaye. The second
section addresses the factors which justify regulating sex between




'2 Edward A. Adams, Divorce Lawyers' Rules Modified a Bit, N.Y. L.J.,
Nov. 2, 1993, at 1.
'3 This Note will not employ a misconduct analysis to justify regulation of
attorney-client sexual relations. Although misconduct has often been used as a
ground for addressing attorneys' sexual conduct, the proponents of New York's
rule did not consider it as a factor for justifying their rule. Misconduct rules
prohibit attorneys from engaging in criminal activities, as well as professional
and nonprofessional activities which either adversely affect attorneys' ability to
practice law or are prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Report, supra
note 7, at 30. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 8.4 (1992);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1983). However,
applying misconduct rules to instances of attorney-client sexual involvements is
problematic because the rules' "lack of specificity leads to their inconsistent
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inadequacies of New York's rule. The fourth section examines
proposed alternatives to New York's rule.
This Note concludes that New York should expand its
regulation of sexual relations between attorneys and clients to other
areas of practice because many of the abuses that New York's
matrimonial law reform targeted also pose dangers to clients
seeking representation in other substantive areas of law. This Note
proposes that regulation applied to areas of practice outside of
matrimonial law, like the new matrimonial rules, must go beyond
mere restrictions of conduct. These new measures must address
situations in which clients' vulnerability to sexual exploitation are
increased, including clients' lack of knowledge about their rights in
the attorney-client relationship. Likewise, these measures should
remove or limit many of the coercive conditions which may have
the effect of forcing a client's consent to sex within the context of
a lawyer-client relationship.
II. NEW YORK's EFFORTS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM AND
PROVIDING A SoLuTION .
A. The Problem as Defined by the Reform Committee
On July 16, 1992, the Administrative Board of the Courts
("the Administrative Board") formed the Committee to Examine
Lawyer Conduct in Matrimonial Actions ("the Committee") in
order to examine the role of attorneys in matrimonial actions in the
New York courts.'4 This action was largely inspired by increased
criticism of the substantive laws and legal procedures particular to
matrimonial practice. 15 Justice Leo Milonas of the Appellate
Division, First Department, chaired the Committee and its members
application." See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 904-10. Likewise, the lack of
specificity in the rules fails to give adequate notice as to whether certain
activities are prohibited. Id.




included four justices representing each of New York's Appellate
Divisions, Judge Judith Kaye of the Court of Appeals, and six
distinguished members of the bar chosen by then Chief Judge Sol
Wachler."6 On May 4, 1993, the Committee issued a report ("the
Report") recommending nine specific reforms. Among these
reforms was a prohibition of sexual relationships between attorneys
and clients during the course of matrimonial representation. 7
Although the Report explicitly states that the purpose of this
regulation is to proscribe the practice of attorney-client sexual
relations in the context of matrimonial law, many of the Commit-
tee's justifications for such a ban persist in other areas of practice.
In its discussion of client vulnerability, the Report compares the
role of the matrimonial attorney to that of the therapist, arguing
that "the necessary intensity of the ... relationship may tend to
activate sexual and other needs and fantasies on part of both the
[attorney] and [client], while weakening the objectivity necessary
for control."' 8 The Report cites a recent American Bar Associa-
tion formal opinion which held that sex between the attorney and
the client potentially breaches an attorney's fiduciary obligations to
his client, inhibits an attorney's independent judgment, and creates
a conflict of interest between the attorney and client."9 The Report
also argues that a sexual relationship during the course of any type
of representation may jeopardize an attorney's ability to render
effective counsel.20 Furthermore, the Report states that although
current ethical rules may provide a framework in which to analyze
the issues of attorney-client sex, they "are inadequate to address the
16 Id. (A complete list of the Committee members and their credentials is
provided in the Report, supra note 7, at app. B).
17Id. at 30.
18 THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, § 2 (1986), reprinted in the Report,
supra note 7, at app. P.
'9 American Bar Association Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 92-364 (1992) [hereinafter the A.B.A. Opinion].
o The Report, supra note 7, at 30.
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more subtle aspects necessarily involved., 21 The Report challeng-
es the notion that addressing the issues of sexual exploitation in
attorney-client relationships is sufficient to combat the problems it
creates. 22 It concludes that an absolute prohibition of attorney-
client sexual relations during the pendency of the representation is
the only way to eliminate the potential dangers to both parties.23
Thus, the drafters focus on three factors to justify the ban on
attorney-client sexual relations during the pendency of domestic
relations matters: client vulnerability, conflict of interest, and
breach of fiduciary duty.
B. The New York Rules
The reforms recommended by the Committee focus on three
general areas. First, the reforms substantially increase clients'
knowledge about their rights in the attorney-client relationship.
Second, they limit the coercive aspects of the relationship that
attorneys have used to exploit clients. Third, they prohibit specific
behavior: attorney-client sexual relations during the pendency of
domestic relations matters. The Administrative Board generally
followed the Committee's recommendations in its official version
of the rules, which took effect on November 30, 1993.24
The reforms enhance clients' knowledge about their rights
in the attorney-client relationship by requiring that attorneys
provide their clients with statements of clients' rights and responsi-
bilities and written retainer agreements. The Committee notes that
although a divorce will seriously affect the lives of the parties and
their children, most divorce clients know little about their rights
21 Id. at 31.
I d. at 30. See also CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3-120.
The Report, supra note 7, at 31.
24 Adams, supra note 12, at 1. (There are several differences between the
proposed rules and the final version of the rules. Those differences which are
relevant to this Note will be discussed infi'a).
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and responsibilities as clients in the attorney-client relationship.'
When such ignorance is present at the inception of the attorney-
client relationship, -[the] relationship begins with an inherent
imbalance that may become exacerbated as the action progress-
es."26 The Committee concludes that a statement of rights will
allow clients to become informed consumers who can "participate
more knowledgeably and efficiently in the process and have more
realistic expectations of counsel." '27 Although the final version of
the statement of rights rectifies clients' lack of knowledge, it is not
as complete as the version initially proposed by the Committee.
Specifically, it does not mention that clients have the right to file
disciplinary complaints against their attorneys.2
The requirement of written retainer agreements was also
designed to further enhance clients' knowledge of their rights and
responsibilities as parties to the attorney-client relationship. Many
clients have voiced dissatisfaction with the high cost of fees, the
way in which they were billed for legal services, and their lack of
information about various aspects of their litigation including the
duration and status of cases. 29 The Committee notes that written
retainers "will foster communication between counsel and client,
2 The Report, supra note 7, at 6.
26 Id. at 6.
27 Id. at 9.
28 Adams, supra note 12, at 1. The Administrative Board deleted this
provision in response to the local bar associations' heated opposition to it. The
bar associations feared that such statements would interfere with the sense of
trust between attorneys and clients. Id. Evidently, the Administrative Board found
that this trust, based on incomplete knowledge, is more important than the clients
right to be informed, despite the Committee's contention that the goal of
informing the public via a clients bill of rights is paramount. The Report, at 10.
See also N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 1400.2, 1200.10 (1993). This
concession also seems inconsistent with one of the motivating factors behind
these reforms: clients and the public have shown increased cynicism toward
lawyers. See generally the Report, supra note 7.
The Report, supra note 7, at 11.
255
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
educate the client, and prepare him or her for the anticipated
developments, delays, and costs of the action."' ° Thus, the written
retainer agreement required by the new rules provides additional
assurances that domestic relations clients will have the knowledge
necessary to protect them from unsavory attorneys.
The rules also reduce many of the coercive forces that
unscrupulous attorneys may use to manipulate their clients. The
new rules prohibit non-refundable retainer fees because these fees
often act as penalties against those clients who wish to discharge
their attorneys.31 Such fees were banned because they interfere
with "a client's unqualified right to discharge counsel, even without
cause," and are therefore "repugnant to public policy."'32 The rules
also restrict attorneys' abilities to obtain security interests to secure
their fees. Non-monied clients in matrimonial matters (usually the
wives) are "often forced to accede to the levy of a security interest
upon a marital asset in order to ensure that not only will the
litigation continue but that counsel will not abandon [the cli-
ent]. 33 The new rule requires that attorneys who apply such
levies must provide for the liens in their retainer agreements, give
notice of such applications to the other spouse, and that the
applications must survive scrutiny by the court.34 The new rule
also prevents an attorney from foreclosing on a mortgage placed on
the marital residence as long as it is the primary residence of the
spouse who consents to the mortgage and that this spouse is the
title holder.3 These changes will increase the knowledge of the
30 Id. at 12. See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1400.3
(1993).
3' The Report, supra note 7, at 16-18. See also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 1400.4 (1993).
32 The Report, supra note 7, at 18.
33 1d. at 19.




parties, reducing surprise over fees. They will also prevent spouses
subject to such security interests from acceding to demands of
unscrupulous lawyers simply because their clients can not afford
not to comply. Similarly, the new rules help relieve some of the
tension that may arise over contested fees by providing fee
arbitration to clients that is binding on both the attorney and the
client3 6 When viewed in the context of curtailing attorney-client
sex, the above rules regarding the financial aspects of the attorney-
client relationship mitigate some of the forces which attorneys may
use to coerce their clients into consenting to sexual interactions. 37
The prohibition against attorney-client sexual interactions in
domestic relations matters has been included in New York's
disciplinary rules for lawyer conduct as a modification. Prior to this
modification, New York had no direct measure for regulating
sexual conduct of attorneys other than by determining whether such
actions violate present ethical standards: general misconduct,
conflict of interest, and breach of fiduciary duty. Now, however,
the amended rule declares that it is misconduct for attorneys in
domestic relations matters to begin sexual relationships with clients
during the course of the representation.38 The rule does not define
some of its terms, including "domestic relations matters" and
"begin a sexual relationship." 39 Likewise, the rule fails to define
how a client may prove such misconduct or how an attorney may
36 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1400.7 (1993).
31 These coercive forces will be discussed infia.
3' N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.3 (7) (B) (1993), which
reads as follows: "In domestic relations matters, [it is misconduct for a lawyer
to] ... begin a sexual relationship with a client during the course of the lawyer's
representation of the client."
The classification of this rule as misconduct is somewhat ironic
because the Committee did not offer a misconduct analysis when it explained
its justifications for the rule. The Report, supra note 7, at 30, 31.
39 These undefined terms will be discussed at greater length infi'a.
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rebut such accusations.' These undefined terms aside, the rule's
approach is clear: domestic relations lawyers should not make
sexual advances toward clients or submit to sexual advances from
clients during the course of their representation of these clients.
III. THREE FACTORS WHICH JUSTIFY REGULATING SEX
BETWEEN ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS
A. Client Vulnerability
Sexual relationships between attorneys and clients pose
problems because attorneys have the capacity to occupy positions
of power over their clients.41 This power imbalance stems partial-
ly from the fiduciary relationship between clients and attorneys. It
also stems from the emotional effects of the attorney-client
relationship on clients. Initially, clients place their trust and
confidence in attorneys because they need attorneys to represent
their concerns within the legal system. The clients' reliance on
attorneys in the ensuing relationship places the attorney in a
position of influence over the client.42
Likewise, attorneys often occupy a position of superiority
over their clients because they possess two forms of knowledge
that their clients lack. First, attorneys' knowledge of the law and
the legal system is what brings clients to them at the outset. 43
Many clients are not aware of their specific rights in an attorney-
client relationship.' Similarly, they may be unaware of the ethical
4 See the Report, supra note 7, at 30, 31.
4, Jorgenson, supra note 7.
42 Id.
" The A.B.A. Opinion, supra note 19.
4 The Report, supra note 7, at 6.
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rules to which lawyers must adhere.45 Second, knowledge about
clients' unique circumstances fosters an unequal balance of power.
Clients often must provide their attorneys with intimate information
that may reveal their particular vulnerabilities. Clients may reveal
economic or psychological weakness or fears, which attorneys may
exploit.46 Such information may also include financial data and
tax returns. Furthermore, it may include clients' behavioral and
sexual habits if they are seeking the divorce on grounds of
adultery, abandonment, constructive abandonment, or cruel and
inhuman treatment because such information is necessary to assert
these causes of action.47 Such knowledge may enhance attorneys'
potential to manipulate their clients' consent to engage in sexual
interactions. For example, an attorney who has specific knowledge
of a client's poor financial condition may bargain to reduce or
eliminate fees in exchange for sex.48
In addition, an attorney may engage in sexual relations with
a client simply because he may know she is emotionally vulnerable
or susceptible to coercion.49 Such vulnerability may be enhanced
by a psychological dependency known as transference, in which
clients' emotional needs may manifest themselves as a desire or
willingness to be accepted which may, in turn, result in a perceived
45 See In re Matter of Rudnick, 177 A.D.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(attorney's failure to notify his client that his personal interest in her as a sexual
partner conflicted with his professional responsibility as her attorney); see also
Bourdon's Case, 565 A.2d 1052, 1057 (N.H. 1989) (discussing attorneys duty to
warn client when the representation may be materially affected by the attorney's
personal relationship with his client).
4 Disciplinary Counsel v. Ressing, 559 N.E.2d 1359 (Ohio 1990) (attorney
had sex with his client and did not charge her for his legal services).
47 See N.Y DOM. REL. LAW art. 10 (Consol. 1992).
' See Jane Doe v. John Roe, 756 F. Supp. 353, 354 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affd,
958 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1992).
49 Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198, 1202-03 (N.H. 1990) (attorney had sex
with a client despite knowing of her psychological condition); In re Bowen, 150
A.D.2d 905 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1989).
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consent to sexual relations." In such cases, attorneys can easily
manipulate a client's emotional vulnerabilities into consent to
engage in sexual activity. Thus, when attorneys are privy to
specific knowledge that may allow them to coerce their clients into
sexual relations, the lawyer's defense that a client consented to the
involvement is inherently suspect.
Clients may be vulnerable for a variety of reasons, including
loss of companionship or loss of child custody, financial loss, and
damaged reputation.51 In such cases it becomes questionable
whether clients are emotionally capable of truly consenting to sex
with their attorneys. Often such fears stem from clients' general
ignorance of their rights as clients, including their right to termi-
nate representation. For example, a client who knows that she can
fire her attorney may be less likely to stay with an attorney who
seeks sex in exchange for an implied or overt promise to perform
his duties. 2 Likewise, a client who knows that her time, money
o Jeffrey A. Barker, Comment, Professional-Client Sex: Is Crininal Liability
an Appropriate means of Enforcing Professional Responsibility, 40 UCLA L.
REv. 1277, at 1303 n.106, 1308 (1993).
Courts have wrestled with the idea of holding attorneys to the same
fiduciary standards as psychotherapists who improperly handle transference by
engaging in sexual activity with their patients. Transference occurs when a
patient undergoing therapy transfers her feelings about a particular subject
toward her therapist. Courts have ruled that it is malpractice for a trained
therapist to mishandle transference. Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101,
105 n.2 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (1991). However,
the court in Suppressed distinguishes the lawyer from the therapist by noting that
lawyers' fiduciary duties differ because their underlying duties differ: attorneys
must provide competent legal representation while therapists engage in conduct
calculated to benefit their patients' emotional well being. Id. at 105. Instead of
focusing on the fact that therapists are trained to recognize transference while
attorneys are not, the court points out that attorneys have a duty to exercise
reasonable care. Imposing this duty recognizes the attendant frailties of attorneys
and clients. Id. In other words, the court recognizes that an attorney may
mistakenly believe he is exercising reasonable care even though his actions may
harm his client.
"' The A.B.A. Opinion, supra note 19.
52 See Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101.
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and emotional energy will not be wasted if she seeks new counsel
will be more likely to do so."
Although New York's new rules regulating attorney conduct
address many of these fears, they quell only those in the domestic
relations matrimonial sphere. The rules specifically attack clients'
lack of knowledge about their legal rights and obligations by
requiring that clients receive a written statement of their rights and
responsibilities as clients upon the commencement of the attorney-
client relationship and written retainer agreements.54 Likewise, the
reforms prohibiting non-refundable retainers, limitations on security
interests, limitations on charging liens, and the right to fee
arbitration restrict potential coercive forces which have been used
against clients in the past."
B. Ethical Considerations
The drafters of New York's rule suggest that ethical
considerations also provide grounds for banning attorney-client sex.
Sexual relations with clients may create conflicts of interest. The
conflict of interest standard is premised on the understanding that
attorneys must maintain a degree of detachment and objectivity
when representing clients.56 An attorney must exercise profession-
" See Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198, 1200 (N.H. 1990); Jane Doe v. John
Roe, 756 F. Supp. 353, 354 (N.D. II1. 1991), affd, 958 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1992);
see also the Report, supra note 7, at 6-19, 24-25.
" See the Report, supra note 7, at 6-18.
55 See the Report, at 16-24. The final version of the rule eliminates the
requirement that dismissed attorneys provide clients with their case files 30 days
after termination regardless of whether the fee has been paid. Adams, supra note
12, at 1.
Jane Doe v. John Roe, 756 F. Supp. 353 (attorney used a settlement
agreement to obtain a lien on his client's home without informing her that he had
done so and then used his client's financial insecurity to pressure her into
continuing a sexual relationship with him).
56 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1980); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1 (1981).
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al judgment that is not compromised by any personal interest of the
attorney which might detrimentally affect the client.57 Sexual
relationships between attorneys and clients during representation
create numerous potential conflicts of interest. They may impair an
attorney's objectivity because the outcome of the case may affect
the attorney's personal interests. An attorney's actions may be
tempered by his desire to shield the client from unpleasant facts, or
to establish, maintain, or terminate a sexual relationship, or even to
punish the client for non-compliance with his sexual desires.58
Moreover, the involvements of a sexual relationship may distract
the attorney from the attorney's primary duty: to zealously pursue
the client's legal interests using independent professional judg-
ment.5 9 Consequently, courts addressing attorney-client sex in
conflict-of-interest actions have focused primarily on whether the
attorney in question has capably executed independent professional
judgment regarding his clients' interests.6
Similarly, attorney-client sexual relations may breach
attorneys' fiduciary duties to their clients. 6' As fiduciaries, attor-
neys are duty bound to subordinate their own personal interests to
those of their clients."62 The fiduciary duty to which lawyers are
bound prohibits lawyers from gaining benefits at their clients'
57 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1983); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1991).
5 Symposium, supra note 7, at 495.
59 Id.
' O'Connell, supra note 2, at 888, 889 (1992).
61 See the A.B.A. Opinion, supra note 19, which states: "A lawyer is bound
to conduct himself as a fiduciary or trustee occupying the highest position of
trust and confidence.... it is his duty to exercise and maintain the utmost good
faith, honesty, integrity, fairness and fidelity." See also Symposium, supra note
7, at 498.
62BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (6th ed. 1990); see also MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1983) (a fiduciary should not permit his
interests to dilute his loyalty to his client).
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expense. When attorneys receive gifts or proprietary interests from
clients, or enter into business transactions with clients, attorneys
must then prove that they have not taken advantage of their clients,
and that their clients provided informed consent.63 Nevertheless,
generating a clear fiduciary duty rule has been problematic in the
context of attorney-client sexual relations.
Courts have taken divergent approaches to the fiduciary
duty in this context. An Illinois woman sued her divorce attorney,
claiming misconduct due to her attorney's sexual involvement with
her.64 She alleged that she submitted to sexual relations with the
attorney on three occasions because she feared that the attorney
"would not advocate for her and her children. ' 65 The court,
although sympathetic to the plaintiff, refused to find a cause of
action because plaintiff failed to state a specific injury related to
the attorney's representation.6 In that case, the client could have
stated a cause of action only if she could have shown that the
attorney pursued his own interests above or at the expense of hers.
However, in another case, the court held that the attorney may have
violated his fiduciary duty because he misrepresented himself to the
client by claiming that he was sterile. 67 Such misrepresentation
may have rendered the client's consent to sexual involvement void-
able.68 Consequently, the court remanded the case to the lower
court with instructions that if the plaintiff proves a confidential
relationship existed, the attorney must then rebut the presumption
of undue influence by proving that the client's consent was
63 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-5, 5-7, DR 5-104
(1983).
' Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal
denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (III. 1991).
6S Id. at 103.
66Id. at 106.
67 Barbara A. v. John G., 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 431 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
68 Id. at 431, 432.
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informed and uncoerced.69 Thus, the courts generally require at
least one of two elements to be present in order to find a breach of
fiduciary duty: measurable injury related to the lawyer's represen-
tation and a lack of informed consent by the client. However, both
these opinions predate the A.B.A.'s recent opinion on sexual
relations with clients which offers a dramatically different perspec-
tive.7° The A.B.A. opinion states that lawyers who take advantage
of clients' vulnerabilities in order to engage in sexual relations with
these clients violate ethical standards because their acts are
"inconsistent with the fiduciary obligation reflected in both the
Model Rules and the Model Code." 71
The drafters of New York's rule have relied heavily on both
the A.B.A.'s opinion and the standards promulgated by the
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers to define its justifi-
cations for the rule prohibiting attorney-client sex from a fiduciary
duty perspective.72 The A.B.A. opinion maintains that these
ethical standards require that when clients' vulnerabilities interfere
with their abilities to make reasonable judgments about themselves
or their situations, attorneys' fiduciary obligations to these clients
rise to a much higher level.73 Similarly, the standards promulgated
by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers prohibit sexual
relations between attorneys and clients.74 Therefore, attorneys who
exploit their dominant position and influence to gain their clients'
69 Id. at 432.
o The A.B.A. Opinion, supra note 19.
71 Id.
The Report, supra note 7, at 30, 31.
7 The A.B.A. Opinion, supra note 19; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1983).
' The Report, supra note 7, at 31.
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consent to sexual favors have breached their fiduciary duty.'
Such abuses of the clients' trust violates attorneys' ethical obli-
gation not to use this trust to their clients' detriment.76 Ultimately,
the fiduciary duty analysis employed by the drafters focuses on
whether an attorney has abused his client's trust to his own sexual
benefit.77
IV. WHY NEw YORK'S RULE IS INSUFFICIENT
A. New York's Rule Leaves Key Terms Undefined
The new New York rule fails to define key terms. This may
complicate its application. First, the rule is vague in that it fails to
adequately indicate the class of individuals covered by the rule. It
merely identifies the class covered as attorneys in "domestic
relations matters. 78 This ambiguity may be clarified by inferring
the legislative intent of the drafters. Likewise, the question of class
may be inferred from the other matrimonial reform rule promulgat-
ed simultaneously with the ban as part of the matrimonial rule
reform package. The other related reforms define the scope of
domestic relations to include actions relating to divorce, separation,
annulment, custody, visitation, maintenance, child support or
alimony.79 However, the ambiguity surrounding the phrase "begin
7' The A.B.A. Opinion, supra note 19, citing MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1983) and MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1991).
76 The Report, supra note 7, citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-3, DRs 7-101 (A) (3), 4-101 (B) (2), 5-101 (1983);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7(b), 1.8(a) (1991).
77 Id.
78 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.3(7) (1993).
79 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1400.1 (1993) (defining the class
as "all attorneys who, on or after November 30, 1993, undertake to represent a
client in a claim, action or proceeding, in either Supreme Court or Family Court,
for divorce, separation, annulment, custody, visitation, maintenance, child
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a sexual relationship," is more difficult to reconcile. Defining this
phrase is necessary to challenge objections regarding the vagueness
of the rule and to prevent potential abuses such as over-applying
the rule."' The first ambiguity in this phrase involves the concept
of beginning a sexual relationship. For example, it is unclear
whether an attorney may violate this rule by flirting with or
propositioning a client, or whether the attorney must actually
engage in sexual conduct with a client. In other words, the rule
does not lend any guidance on determining the point at which a
sexual relationship commences. Likewise, it raises a concern that
any behavior which may be perceived as an attempt to solicit or
entice a sexual relationship would be scrutinized. This, in turn,
could cause a chilling effect on non-sexual attorney-client relation-
ships because attorneys would want to avoid even the hint of such
improprieties. 8' Additionally, it is questionable whether the rule
speaks to situations where the client initiates the conduct. Similarly,
individuals' conceptions of what constitutes a sexual relationship
may vary from intercourse to touching.' Finally, that the New
York rule lacks a well defined burden of proof standard may lead
to frivolous claims and inconsistent results, particularly when the
vague burden of proof standard is coupled with the aforementioned
ambiguities. Therefore, the rule should be modified to include a
definition section which rectifies these potential problems.
support, or alimony, or to enforce or modify a judgment or order in connection
with any such claims, actions or proceedings.").
80 O'Connell, supra note 2, at 917.
8' Suppressed v. Suppressed, 565 N.E.2d 101, 106 n.3 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990),
appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (Ill. 1991).
8 O'Connell, supra note 2, at 917.
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B. New York's Ban on the Commencement of Attorney-
Client Sexual Relations During the Pendency of
Domestic Relations Matters Ignores Other Areas of
Practice where Similar Dangers Exist
This Note does not question the merits of applying theories
of vulnerability, conflict of interest, and breach of fiduciary duty
to regulate attorney-client sexual relations. Rather, it proposes that
if New York accepts these factors as justifications for its limited
ban on sexual relations between attorneys and clients, it should
apply them to other areas of practice in order to determine whether
the dangers of attorney-client sex exist in those areas as well.
New York's rule prohibiting domestic relations attorneys
from engaging in attorney-client sexual relations is underinclusive
because it fails to address other areas of practice where similar
dangers of client vulnerability, conflicts of interest and breaches of
fiduciary duties exist. While the A.B.A. highlights the fact that
dangers and abuses of attorney-client sex exist in domestic relations
matters, it in no way expresses that these dangers are exclusive to
the practice of domestic relations law. Rather, the A.B.A. states
that clients' legal situations often enhance their vulnerabilities
because they often retain attorneys during times of crisis. Thus,
where domestic relations clients may be facing the termination of
an interpersonal relationship due to an impending divorce or
custody battle, criminal clients may face the potential loss of
liberty, immigration clients may face deportation, and probate
clients may grieve the loss of loved ones and often face a future of
uncertain finances." Additionally, case law provides evidence that
the power imbalances inherent in the attorney-client relationship,
which can place attorneys in positions of dominance over their
clients, exist outside of the domestic relations arena.84 For exam-
ple, one attorney manipulated his personal injury client's ignorance
of the law by deceiving her into permitting him to touch and
' The A.B.A. Opinion, supra note 19.
See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 890-92.
267
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
photograph her in a partially disrobed state." Similarly, in one
criminal action, another attorney, knowing his client could not
afford his fee, bargained to reduce his fee in exchange for oral sex
and nude pictures of his client and her niece.8 6 Likewise, one
attorney manipulated his criminal client's desire to restore her
parole status and his knowledge of her alcoholism to gain sexual
favors.87 These abuses and many others mirror many of those
which have occurred in the domestic relations practice, proving that
the problem is not unique to the domestic relations field.
Several commentators support the idea of extending the rule
beyond the field of matrimonial law. One argues that attorneys
should be banned from commencing attorney-client sexual relations
during the course of representation because such relations are
fraught with potential conflicts of interest and breaches of fiduciary
duty.88 Another argues that sexual relations with clients may
preclude attorneys from making objective decisions, particularly in
practice areas where clients are highly vulnerable, including
divorce, child custody, criminal, and pro bono cases. 9 This theory
would extend a rule regulating attorney-client sex to include any
area where the subject matter impairs attorneys' ability to render
independent professional judgment because of conflicts of interest
or emotional involvements.' Likewise, it applies to situations
where clients are unable to exercise their own independent
" Florida Bar v. Samaha, 557 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1990) (per curiam) (attorney
deceived his client into believing that she was obligated to partially disrobe and
permit him to touch and photograph her in order to prepare an adequate case).
m In re Wood, 489 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1986) (per curiam).
s7 In re Ridgeway, 462 N.W.2d 671 (Wis. 1990)(per curiam). See also
People v. Gibbons, 685 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1984)(En banc)(where a criminal
defendant, at the suggestion of her attorney, engaged in sexual relations with
him. The grievance committee found that the attorney placed the client "in a
position in which she was unduly dependent on the Respondent [attorney] and
in which she may have not been able to exercise free choice.").
See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 909-14.




judgment, provide meaningful consent, or exhibit an unusual
dependence on their attorney.9
V. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES
A. Extending the Ban Practice-Wide
The drafters of New York's rule believe that the only way
the potential risks of both parties can be eliminated is by banning
sexual relations between attorneys and the clients they represent
during the pendency of domestic relations actions.9 The rule does
have some favorable attributes: it addresses the issue, it is some-
what specific, and the policies behind it are clear. However, it does
have its drawbacks. As noted above, it is underinclusive because it
ignores similar situations where the dangers and potential injuries
are identical or nearly identical to those faced by domestic relations
clients.93 However, expanding the ban to other practice areas
would be problematic on several fronts. A rule that automatically
bans attorney-sexual relations is functionally paternalistic because
it assumes that clients -- most often women-- are automatically
incapable of giving informed consent.94 Such a rule also raises
serious constitutional issues.
A ban affecting sexual relations conflicts with the Constitu-
tion on several grounds. First, it may sweep too broadly and
infringe upon constitutionally protected freedoms, including the
"' Id. Levy's vulnerability-centered model is also followed in Symposium,
supra note 7, at 504.
92 The Report, supra note 7, at 30.
13 See the A.B.A. Opinion, supra note 19; O'Connell, supra note 2, at
890-92; see also Florida Bar v. Samaha, 557 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 1990)(per
curiam); it re Wood, 489 N.E.2d 1189 (Ind. 1986)(per curiam).
94 Barker, supra note 50, at 1322-23; see also Edwards v. Edwards, 165
A..2d 362 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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freedom to choose a sexual partner.95 Although states may regu-
late professional activities, states must satisfy a two-pronged strict
scrutiny test when their means impair citizens' fundamental rights.
First, the state must have a legitimate interest at stake. Second, the
measure chosen must be narrowly drawn to further that interest."'
Since the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that choices regarding
sexual partners are within the fundamental zones of privacy
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, proponents of a ban
would have to prove that no less restrictive measures could
accomplish their goal.97 A ban would impair the rights of both
attorneys and clients because it would interfere with the rights of
both to choose their sexual partners. Therefore, the state would
have to show the dangers inherent in such relations and then prove
that such a ban is the only effective means of preventing such
dangers. However, since there is compelling evidence that other
methods may be employed which are less invasive, a per se ban
would most likely fail strict scrutiny.98 For example, most of the
documented abuses have involved clients who were exploited by
their attorneys because these clients were unaware of their rights
in the attorney-client relationship. 9 In such situations, a less
9' Barker, supra note 50, at 1328 (citing Thomburgh v. American College
of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986)).
96 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
' See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937).
Cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (limiting Constitutional protection
to heterosexual interactions in jurisdictions which have anti-sodomy laws).
98 California has recently adopted a rule that addresses the problem without
expressly banning all attorney client sexual relations. CALIFORNIA Bus. &
PROFESSIONAL CODE § 6106.9 (1993).
9' See Jorgenson, supra note 7; the A.B.A. Opinion, supra note 19; the
Report, supra note 7, at 6; see also In re Matter of Rudnick, 177 A.D.2d 121
(N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Bourdon's Case, 565 A.2d 1052, 1057 (N.H. 1989);
Disciplinary Counsel v. Ressing, 559 N.E.2d 1359 (Ohio 1990); Jane Doe v.
John Roe, 756 F. Supp. 353, 354 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affd, 958 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.
1992); Drucker's Case, 577 A.2d 1198, 1202-03 (N.H. 1990); In re Bowen, 150
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invasive alternative would be to simply advise clients of their rights
through a statement of clients rights and privileges. This would not
preclude states from regulating such relationships in other cases,
where clients' emotional involvements with their cases or their
emotional frailties would render them susceptible to coercion,
despite knowing their rights. However, strict scrutiny demands that
the state make efforts to define this class. One commentator argues
that a ban on the commencement of sexual relations during the
pendency of the representation limits only the clients whom
attorneys may represent, not the individuals with whom these
attorney may engage in sexual relations. However, such a ban
would fall as well because it is an indirect limitation of procre-
ational rights and such limitations by the government are inherently
suspect."c
Nevertheless, a ban on sexual relations is not necessarily
untenable. A rule may survive scrutiny if it is narrowly drawn. 10'
A rule that limits the ban to areas or situations where the client
may be vulnerable may satisfy compelling state interest require-
ments while limiting the chilling effects and limitations of a per se
ban. 02 Banning the commencement of sexual relationships during
the pendency of the representation of vulnerable clients or during
potentially dangerous situations may be drawn narrowly enough to
satisfy strict scrutiny. However, the clients and situations to which
such a ban would apply would probably have to be clearly defined
for the rule to survive.
B. Employing a Rebuttable Presumption Rule
Some commentators advocate a rebuttable presumption rule
which would operate on the notion that attorneys who have had sex
A.D.2d 905 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 545 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1989).
10o Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977).
101 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
,02 Barker, supra note 50, at 1332 n.243, 1334.
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with their clients have performed incompetently. 103 Such rules
would allow clients who offer proof of an attorney-client sexual
relationship to shift the burden to their attorneys to prove that they
did not exploit their clients because the representation was
competent, despite their sexual relationship.' 4 Although a rebut-
table presumption rule would be less invasive to privacy rights than
a per se ban, it may suffer from being overinclusive because it
could have a chilling effect on attorneys' ability to socialize with
clients. 5 It would also be underinclusive because it would allow
attorneys who take advantage of their clients' vulnerabilities to
survive unscathed if they could prove they represented their clients
adequately.106 Attorneys who know they will merely be punished
if they perform their legal duties inadequately would not be
deterred by such a rule. Similarly, clients whose vulnerabilities
have been abused would not be able to allege an injury unless their
attorneys were actually incompetent. Therefore, a rebuttable
presumption rule needs to be more narrowly drawn in order to have
any deterrence value.
103 See CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3-120 (B)(3), (E)
(Discussion Draft 1991). On August 13, 1992, the Supreme Court of California
adopted Rule 3-120 as it was proposed, but deleted proposed subparagraph E,
which reads as follows:
(E) A member who engages in sexual relations with his or her
client will be presumed to violate rule 3-120, paragraph (3)(3).
This presumption shall only be used as a presumption affecting
the burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings involving
alleged violations of these rules. "Presumption affecting the
burden of proof" means that presumption defined in Evidence
Code sections 605 and 606.
See also Jorgenson, supra note 7.
104 Id.




VI. A PROPOSED RULE
The problems of both the per se ban and rebuttable
presumption may be avoided by combining them into one multi-
tiered rule. The new rule should be incorporated into the existing
ethical structure. This can be achieved by declaring that sexual
relations constitute a per se breach of fiduciary duty in dangerous
situations or with vulnerable clients, instead of instituting a per se
ban on attomey-client sex in all areas of practice. °7 Similarly,
this proposed rule would deem the sexual interests of attorneys
who have had sex with their clients as interests which may conflict
with their clients' interests.'" Consequently, the proposed rule
would identify areas and circumstances where clients are particular-
ly vulnerable to becoming involved in sexual relations with their
attorneys. 9 The first prong of the rule should define the nature
of the prohibited conduct in addition to defining the focus and
scope of the rule.
Most of the ambiguities in New York's rule center around
the question of which types of behavior fit within the definition of
the phrase "begin a sexual relationship." This Note proposes the
following definition of the behavior which should be prohibited:
initiating or allowing the initiation of sexual intercourse, any
touching or coerced contact of the sexual organs, or other intimate
areas for the purpose of either party's sexual arousal, gratification
or abuse." ° This aspect of the rule would prevent unscrupulous
107 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A)(3),
DR 4-101 (B)(2), DR 5-101 (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.7(b) (1991).
,o' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-5, 5-7, DR 5-104
(1983).
,09 See Levy, supra note 6, at 657-62.
... O'Connell, supra note 2, at 916. See also CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT § 3-120(A)(1993) which states: ""sexual relations" means sexual
intercourse or the touching of an intimate part of another person for the purpose
of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse."
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attorneys from using their position of power to initiate or inspire
sexual relations. Likewise, it would prevent attorneys from abusing
clients who initiate such actions motivated by fear or transference.
The scope of the rule should be defined by three particular
areas of vulnerability. The first area should include domestic
relations matters, probate matters, criminal matters and immigration
matters. Clients in these areas may become vulnerable because they
are facing the potential termination of familial rights and obli-
gations, coping with the loss of a loved one, or facing imprison-
ment or deportation. The second area should include clients whose
decisionmaking abilities are impaired by psychological or emotion-
al conditions. By virtue of ethical considerations, such clients must
be considered extremely vulnerable."' The third area should
include pro bono clients because their financial situations often
render them dependent on their attorneys as the only means of
available representation.
In other areas where the dangers are not as pronounced, the
rule should employ a rebuttable presumption that attorneys who
engage in sexual relations with their clients have breached their
fiduciary duty."' This rule would be applied in areas where the
attorney may have abused his legal knowledge or his personal
knowledge of the client's vulnerabilities to gain his client's consent
to an apparent sexual act. It would also apply to cases where the
relationship affects the attorney's ability to render independent
professional judgment.
However, a rule limiting certain conduct does not prevent
unscrupulous attorneys from taking advantage of unknowing
clients. Therefore, there should be an informational component to
the rule. Attorneys should be required to advise their clients of
their rights and obligations in the relationship. A universal clients'
bill of rights can address this problem, but it can only do so if it
clearly defines the scope of acceptable attorney behavior. Such a
rule should, unlike New York's matrimonial rule, also inform
... MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1983).




clients of their rights in terms of the measures available to them so
that they can respond to attorneys who conduct themselves
inappropriately."' 3
VII. CONCLUSION
The new rules promulgated by Judge Kaye do not go far
enough. Furthermore, they will need a radical alteration in order to
be applied throughout the field. A per se ban on sexual relations
must be narrowly constructed to survive Constitutional scrutiny.
Such construction can be achieved by limiting the rule to address
only those sexual relationships commenced during the course of
situations in which clients may be vulnerable. However, such a
limited ban would leave other areas of danger unaddressed.
Therefore, the rule should employ a second tier such as a narrowly
defined rebuttable presumption that would address other areas of
lesser vulnerability. The new rule must also address several areas
including clients' general ignorance of their rights. Therefore, a
clients' bill of rights and responsibilities is a necessary step in that
direction. However, the clients' bill of rights provided by the New
York rule does not go far enough because it does not fully apprise
clients of their rights. Thus, in order for New York to more
effectively reduce the dangers of attorney-client sexual relations, it
must revise and more adequately define the scope of its rule
regulating such conduct and provide the public with the knowledge
necessary to avoid being exploited.
13 See Adams supra note 12.

